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Abstract
This paper studies optimal quarantines (can also be interpreted as lockdowns or self-
isolation) when there is an infectious disease with SIS dynamics and infections can
cause disease related mortality in a dynamic general equilibrium neoclassical growth
framework. We characterize the optimal decision and the steady states and how these
change with changes in effectiveness of quarantine, productivity of working from home,
contact rate of disease and rate of mortality from the disease. A standard utilitarian
welfare function gives the counter-intuitive result that increasing mortality reduces
quarantines but increases mortality and welfare while economic outcomes and infec-
tions are largely unaffected. With an extended welfare function incorporating welfare
loss due to disease related mortality (or infections generally) however, quarantines in-
crease, and the decreasing infections reduce mortality and increase economic outcomes.
Thus, there is no optimal trade-off between health and economic outcomes. We also
study sufficiency conditions and provide the first results in economic models with SIS
dynamics with disease related mortality - a class of models which are non-convex and
have endogenous discounting so that no existing results are applicable.
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The Covid-19 pandemic has brought the study of interaction of infectious diseases, hence,
epidemiology modeling and economic outcomes to the forefront of economic research. As for
Covid-19 there are as yet no medical interventions to prevent and treat the disease, there is
also an interest in the role of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) to control the disease.
The interaction of epidemiology modeling and economic outcomes predates the Covid-19
outbreak (see Bonds, et al. (2004), Goenka and Liu (2013, 2020), Goenka, Liu and Nguyen
(2020), and Toxvaerd (2019)). However, these first generation of models concentrated on
situations where there is no disease related mortality which in times of Covid-19 has become
especially central to the problem.1
This paper studies optimal lockdown, i.e. where both the healthy (susceptible) and the
infected (infectious) can be quarantineed. We model this in a neoclassical growth framework
where the disease evolves according to SIS dynamics. This is motivated by the fact it is not
well understood for how long is disease related immunity conferred for coronaviruses such
as Covid-19. The evidence is preliminary and there is emerging evidence that subsequent
immunity may not be long lasting.2 As we are concerned about the medium to longer run in
this paper we abstract from the temporary immunity phase (i.e. the state R).3 Households
can save through investing in capital and production of the single consumption good uses
capital and labor. Only the healthy (susceptible) individuals can work. In this paper,
motivated by Covid-19 we abstract from health expenditures that can be used for prevention
and treatment4 and the only way to control the disease is by quarantines. Quarantines are
imperfect as a mechanism to control diseases as effectiveness or compliance of these varies.
The productivity of those quarantined is reduced, and the labor supply is the fraction of the
healthy not quarantined plus the reduced productivity of the healthy quarantined.5 There
is disease related mortality so a fraction of the infected die. The way the optimal quarantine
decision is modeled, it can also be interpreted as the optimal decision to self-isolate. The
distinction between self-isolation and a quarantine is that in the latter it is mandated rather
than an individual decision. In all our model the households are homogeneous and we
do not model disease related externality where households do not take into account the
1Chakraborty, et al. (2010) modeled disease related mortality in an overlapping generations framework
but did not use a compartment epidemiology model.
2Long, et al. (2020) using data from China find evidence consistent with steep decline in 2-3 months.
Similar results were found in a study in the US (Ibarrando, et al. (2020)). On the other hand Wajnberg,
et al. (2020) and Sekine, et al. (2020) find evidence suggesting longer immunity. As a modeling stategy
Kissler, et al. (2020) use an SIRS model for medium run projections.
3This is also consisted with many of the other infectious diseases that are the main sources of disease
related mortality, in particular malaria, tuberculosis, dengue, and influenza also do not have disease related
immunity. While an individual may have immunity to a particular strain of influenza for a short period, the
virus mutates and there is no lasting immunity. HIV/AIDS is a disease of SI class and its epidemiology is
not captured by either SIS or SIR models.
4Goenka and Liu (2020) and Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2020) modeled optimal health expenditures in a
similar growth framework.
5In our model the productivity of all healthy who are quarantined drops but as there is only partial
compliance, only a fraction of those quarantined are not relevant for disease dynamics.
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effect of their decisions on the evolution of the disease in the population.6 The preliminary
evidence also suggests that the macroeconomic consequences of the two are similar.7 For self-
isolation, infections can be higher in heterogeneous populations for obvious reasons. Thus,
the quarantine or lockdown can also be interpreted as optimally chosen self-isolation. There
is an emerging literature on quarantines in economic epidemiology models but these these
papers generally look at the very short-run and do not model capital accumulation.8
The model is a fully dynamic general equilibrium model and we characterize the Euler
equations that govern the evolution of the economy. As our interest is beyond the very short
run, we show that there are two steady states for the economy: a disease free and disease
endemic steady state. The optimal quarantine depends on a function of the parameters
and the equilibrium values of the economic variables. The equilibrium reproduction rate,
R∗0 will depend on both the infectivity of the disease and endogenous economic choices.
As the degree of compliance, the drop in productivity from working at home, and contact
and mortality rates of the disease are treated as parameters we vary them to see how the
equilibrium economic and health outcomes vary with them. As compliance with quarantine
increases, the optimal quarantine first increases and then decreases reflecting the fact that the
impact of the product of degree of quarantine and compliance. Thus, increase in compliance
eventually can be traded-off with a reduced quarantine. With increased productivity from
working from home, there is a reduced trade-off between health and wealth, and the optimal
quarantine increases. The effect of increasing the contact rate on the optimal quarantine is
also what we would expect. However, in a pure utilitarian model where the welfare depends
only on consumption, as mortality is increased there are counter-intuitive results: not only
does the level of quarantine decrease but welfare and the economic outcomes increase. This
is similar to the result in Young (2005) but in our model is driven by the fact that increased
mortality results in fewer infections.9
This raises one of the two substantive methodological issues with incorporating the dis-
ease related mortality. What should be the welfare function? Thus, we extend the utilitarian
welfare function by including a loss in welfare from infections and mortality (the latter is
a fixed fraction of infections). This has also been done in other papers (Acemoglu, et al.
(2020), Alvarez, et al. (2020), Jones, et al. (2020) for a partial list). We characterize the
optimal quarantine with the extended welfare function and derive the steady states. As
we would expect increasing the weight on welfare loss from infections increases the severity
of quarantine. When we evaluate varying the parameters, the effects of varying compli-
ance, home productivity, and contact rates are qualitatively similar with higher quarantines
and better economic and health outcomes. However, the effect on increasing mortality is
strikingly different, with higher mortality leading to more stringent lockdowns. The welfare
initially decreases but eventually increases as stringent quarantines bring down infections.
While in the utilitarian model economic variables and infections are not affected significantly
6This has been modeled in different ways in the literature, see Geoffard and Philipson (1996), Gersovitz
and Hammer (2004), Goenka and Liu (2020), and Toxvaerd (2019).
7See Andersen, et al. (2020) and Danske Bank (2020) for comparisons across Scandinavian countries.
8See for example Acemoglu, et al. (2020), Alvarez, et al. (2020), Eichenbaum, et al. (2020), Giannitsarou,
et al. (2020), and Jones, et al. (2020).
9Young (2005) uses a Solow model so savings and investment do not adjust and the primary mechanism
is the increase in per-capita capital stock.
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from higher mortality, in the extended welfare function, there are decreased infections (due to
more stringent quarantines) and better economic outcomes due to the decreased infections.
Thus, in equilibrium, there is no trade-off between “health-wealth” trade-off.
The second methodological issue that has not received attention is the implications for
evaluating sufficiency of first order conditions in optimal control problems. It is already
known in the literature that epidemiology dynamics are not convex and the first order con-
ditions to control problems need not be sufficient. This was first pointed out in the economics
literature by Gersovitz and Hammer (2004) and sufficiency for SIS models without disease
related mortality were provided by Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014). However, with dis-
ease related mortality, as population size changes with the level of infection, effectively the
discount rate becomes endogenous. To our knowledge, while such models are being in the
emerging literature, there are no established transversality and sufficiency conditions with
endogenous discounting in a non-convex model. In this paper, we prove the transversality
and sufficiency conditions for the economic SIS model with disease related mortality (Sec-
tion 6). Following, Obstfeld (1990), as discounting is endogenous, we introduce another state
variable for the rate of discount. Given the special structure of the problem, we directly show
the relevant transversality conditions and establish sufficiency by adapting the method of
Leitmann and Stalford (1970) that was used for convex problems. Thus, these are the first
results for sufficiency with endogenous discounting for non-convex problems.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the economic epidemiology
model, Section 3 studies the equilibrium steady states of the standard utilitarian model,
Section 4 does comparative statics of equilibrium steady state outcomes, Section 5 studies
the extended welfare model, Section 6 studies the transversality and sufficiency conditions,
and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Economic Epidemiology Model
The model is based on the growth model with SIS disease dynamics in Goenka and Liu
(2013) and Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014) to include disease related mortality and to
model lockdowns. To avoid keeping track of the cross-sectional distribution of the healthy
and infected individuals, and to stay close to the canonical endogenous growth model, we
adopt the framework of a large representative household.
Households: We assume the economy is populated by a continuum of non-atomic identical
households who are the representative decision-making agents. In the absence of the disease,
the size of the population in each household grows over time at the rate of b− d ≥ 0, where
b is the birth rate and d is the death rate. Within each household, an individual is either
healthy or infected by the diseases. We assume that diseases follow the SIS dynamics (see
the discussion in the Introduction).
We model the infectious disease as having two effects - reducing productivity of the
infected and disease related mortality. We make the simplifying assumption that an infected
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individual is incapacitated by the disease or that the productivity falls to zero. 10 We assume
the labor is supplied inelastically.11 If i is the fraction of household infected, the proportion
φ of these succumb to the disease.






where ρ is the discount factor with ρ > b− d, and the initial size of household is assumed to
be one.
Assumption 1. The felicity function u, u : R+ → R is C2 with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0.
The discount rate, ρ > 0.
Physical capital accumulations follow the standard law of motion with the deprecation
rate δ ∈ (0, 1).
In this paper we concentrate on the control of the disease through the imposition of a lock-
down. This is motivated by Covid-19 and other coronaviruses including SARS and MERS for
which there were are no vaccinations or proven prophylactic medicines or proven treatments
for recovery at the time of writing the paper. All methods of control are non-pharmaceutical
interventions (NPIs). The earlier paper Goenka and Liu (2013) studied imperfect vaccina-
tion and isolation to control the disease. In that paper the costs were not modeled and the
interventions were ad-hoc to stabilize the disease rather than optimal choices. The paper
Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014) modeled optimal reduction of infectivity and recovery from
the disease through health expenditures. Goenka and Liu (2020) concentrated on reduction
of infectivity from health expenditures12 and distinguished between the decentralized case
where households do not take into account the affect of their decisions on disease transmis-
sion, i.e. the disease externality, and the optimal public health policy.As this analysis is
motivated by lockdowns as a method of disease control imposed by governments (or optimal
self-imposed self-isolation) when there are no medical interventions we concentrate on the
socially optimal solution abstracting away from these issues which have already been studied
in our earlier work.
The way we model lockdown is that a fraction, θ, with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 of both susceptibles and
infected population is quarantined. Thus, there is no effective track-and-trace-and-isolate
10How much productivity is affected varies across diseases. The recent comprehensive estimates of disability
weights used to compute DALYs is one possible measure of affect on productivity (see Salomon, et al. (2012),
Murray, et al. (2012)). For some specific diseases there are estimates in the economic literature on loss of
income from which effect on productivity is imputed (e.g. Weisbrod, et al. (1974) study effect of five parasitic
diseases on banana plantation workers in St. Lucia; Fox, et al. (2004) study loss of income to tea pickers
infected with HIV/AIDS in Kenya). For Covid-19 many of the infected are asymptomatic and to the extent
they are not isolated, their productivity is not affected. For symptomatic cases, even for “mild” cases that
do not require hospitalization, the effect of the disease is debilitating and can have long lasting tail effects.
11In Goenka and Liu (2012) we endogenize the labor-leisure choice with SIS disease dynamics and show
that the dynamics are invariant under standard assumptions.
12The paper also considered the effect of education on affecting disease transmission. The channel is that
education increases greater awareness and understanding of health risks.
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(TTI) program that will isolate the infective (and those exposed to the infection).13 The
experience of quarantines shows that even with these in place, infections may or may not
come down. While infections did come down in Italy and Spain under the quarantine, in
UK they continued to remain significant. Thus, we model the effectiveness of the quarantine
or compliance with the lockdown to reduce infections by the parameter δ1, with 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 1.
When δ1 = 0 the lockdown is not effective and with δ1 = 1 it is fully effective. In the
paper we concentrate on partial compliance, 0 < δ1 < 1. Effectiveness of the quarantine
depends on both the sanctions for violating it and on compliance with it. The determinants
of compliance with a lockdown are many with complex interactions between them.14 In this
paper we treat this as a parameter.
During a quarantine, susceptible individuals may continue to work from home. However,
their productivity from working from home is likely to be affected. Some individuals are
in occupations where they cannot work from home. The emerging evidence is that there is
considerable heterogeneity on what occupations and who can work from home without loss
of productivity. 15 Thus, we model the productivity of working from home by a parameter
δ2, with 0 ≤ δ1 ≤ 1. When δ2 = 0 the productivity of working from home is zero and with
δ2 = 1 it is as productive as absent a lockdown. There is an emerging literature on who can
and who cannot work from home we treat this as a parameter.
Production: The production side of the model is a standard neo-classical growth model
where households can invest in capital which is productive next period and depreciates at
rate δ.16 Households own representative firms that use capital and labor as inputs.
Assumption 2. The production function f(k, l), f : R2+ → R is C2 with
1. fk > 0, fl > 0,
2. f is concave and homogeneous of degree 1,
13There is diversity across countries on the effectiveness of TTI programs. Many countries do have test-
and-track programs for Covid (e.g. Singapore, Korea, Germany, China) and many of the countries that have
the largest number of infections do not have fully effective ones (e.g. US, UK, India, Brazil, Sweden, Russia,
South Africa). Even with test-and-tracking, whether the infected and potentially infected can be isolated
varies considerably and depends on personal compliance.
14The emerging literature on the determinants of compliance shows that some of the factors are trust
of policy makers (Bargain and Aminjonov (2020), Vinck, et al. (2019)), civic engagement (Barrios, et al.
(2020)), age (Belot, et al. (2020)), social capital (Borgonovi, Andrieu and Subramaniam (2020), Deopa
and Fortunato (2020), Mazzona (2020)), political views (Brodeur, Grigoryeva, and Kattan(2020)), broader
socio-economic determinanst including gender, political partisanship and risk tolerance (Fan, Orhun and
Turjeman (2020), Papageorge, et al. (2020)).
15See Adams-Prassl, et al. (2020), Alipour,Falck and SchÃ 14 ller (2020), Bartik, et al. (2020), Dingell and
Neiman (2020), Gottlieb, et al. (2020), Hensvik, Le Barbanchon and Rathelot (2020), Kalenkoski and Wulff
Pabilonia (2020), Saltiel (2020)) for some examples of this emerging literature. The effect on productivity is
affected by occupation and industry, number and age of children, care responsibilities, gender issues, access
to technology, amongst other things.
16Goenka and Liu (2020) have an endogenous growth model where there is human capital accumulation
and households choose time to work and time for human capital accumulation. It uses SIS dynamics without
disease related mortality.
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Figure 1. The Transfer Diagram For the SIS Epidemiology Model with disease related
mortality
Note: In a SIS epidemiology model, the total population is divided into three groups: the susceptible
denoted as S and the infected denoted as I. The birth rate is b and newborns are born healthy and
susceptible. All individuals irrespective of health status die at the rate d. The susceptible get infected at
the rate α IN , the infected recover at the rate γ and might die at the rate φ as a result of being infected.
3. with f(0, ·) = f(·, 0) = 0.
4. limk→0 fk(k, ·) = liml→0 fl(·, l) =∞; limk→∞ fk(k, ·) = 0.
5. The physical capital depreciates at the rate δ ∈ (0, 1].
The Epidemiology Model
For the epidemiology model we use a SIS model with standard incidence but with disease
related mortality. An individual can be in one of two health states, S, where the individual
is healthy and susceptible to the disease, or I where the individual is infected and infectious
enough to transmit the disease.
Assumption 3. The epidemiology model is given by the following system of differential
equations :
Ṡ = bN − αS(1− δ1θ)I(1− δ1θ)
N




− γI − dI − φI
Ṅ = (b− d)N − φI
The parameters in the model are b the birth rate, i.e. new flow of susceptibles, d the
death or death or exit rate of infected which is not related to the infectious disease, α is the
contact rate of adequate contacts that can transmit the disease, γ is the recovery rate from
the disease, and φ is the mortality from infections due to the disease. We use the standard
or density dependence model where the transmission of the disease depends on the fraction
of infected rather than number of infected. In the second model, there are scale effects which
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are seen in herd models but are thought not to characterize human interactions where the
pattern of interactions is relatively invariant to population size. 17 In this paper, motivated
by diseases such as Covid-19 for which there is no proven therapies or prophylactic treatment,
we treat these as parameters.18
Since N = S + I, we define s = S/N and i = I/N . We have s + i = 1 and ṡ + i̇ = 0.








= α(1− δ1θ)2(1− i)i− bi− γi− φi+ φi2,
where the total population grows at the rate b − d − φi. Note that the population growth
rate here is endogenous and affected by the prevalence of infectious diseases.
For the SIS epidemiological model, there are two steady states. One is the disease free
steady state with i∗ = 0 and diseases are fully eradicated. The disease free steady state
always exists and it could be stable or not stable depending on parameters. The other
steady state is disease endemic steady sate with i∗ = 1 − b+γ
α(1−δ1θ)2−φ . The prevalence of
diseases decreases when birth rate (b) or recovery rate (γ) increases, or when contact rate
(α) decreases. When disease related death rate (φ) is higher, the fraction of the infected is
smaller as these individuals cannot infect others. When there is wider lockdown (θ) or the
efficacy of lockdown (δ1) is higher, the fraction of the infected is also smaller. Note that
disease endemic steady state exists if and only if 0 < b+γ
α(1−δ1θ)2−φ < 1. This steady if it
exists is stable and in that situation the disease free steady state is unstable. For details see
Appendix 1.
We study simplest model where the only way to control infection, and hence, disease
related mortality is through lock down θ in order to focus on the issues introduced by
disease related mortality.
The total labor force is
L = (1− θ + δ2θ)S
Individuals who are not infected and not quarantined can participate in the labor market
with productivity equal to 1, that is, (1 − θ)S. Moreover, people who are healthy but
quarantined can work at home with productivity δ2 ( 0 ≤ δ2 ≤ 1), that is, δ2θS). δ2 captures
the productivity of working at home. When δ2 = 0, people can not work at home. In this
case, full lockdown (θ = 1) is never desirable as the total output would be zero. When
δ2 = 1, working at home does not reduce productivity at all, and full lockdown is always the
best choice and the economy will be in a disease free steady state. In the paper, we focus on
the case where 0 < δ2 < 1.
The labor force is given as:
l = L/N = (1− θ + δ2θ)(1− i)
17For a further discussion of the SIS model see Goenka and Liu (2020).
18In earlier papers, Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014) and Goenka and Liu (2020) these were endogenized.
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3 Standard utilitarian welfare model
The objective is to maximize the total welfare which is the discounted sum of utility only
from consumption multiplied by the size of the population. This is the standard utilitarian
welfare function used in economics. It is assuming that each household is weighted equally
and there is perfect insurance within each household. Multiplying the household’s utility by
the population size is standard in the literature and will capture the effect of variation in











As the population size is varying, the discount factor becomes endogenous and varies
with infections in the population. To solve this maximization problem with an endogenous





(ρ− b+ d+ φi(τ))dτ,
where
∆̇ = ρ− b+ d+ φit.
Note that with changes in infections, i, disease related mortality, φi changes the effective
discount rate. Note that ∆ is affected by a state variable. None of the existing results
for sufficiency of the first order conditions to the optimal control will apply as discounting
is endogenous and the problem is non-convex. The social planner problem becomes (we







k̇ = f(k, l)− c− δk − (b− d− φi)k (2)
i̇ = α(1− δ1θ)2(1− i)i− bi− γi− φi+ φi2 (3)
∆̇ = ρ− b+ d+ φi (4)
l = (1− θ + δ2θ)(1− i) (5)
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, and i ≥ 0 (6)
where the are parameters: ρ, b, d, δ, α, γ, φ, δ1, δ2; the control variables: c, θ; and the state
variables: k, i, l,∆.
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3.1 Characterization of Steady States
As the effective discount rate varies with the rate of infections (which are not monotonic)
there can be a time-consistency problem. To avoid this we work the present value Hamilto-
nian with this additional state variable (see Obstfeld (1990)) which is:
L = e−∆u(c) + λ1{f(k, (1− θ + δ2θ)(1− i))− c− δk − (b− d− φi)k}+
+λ2{α(1− δ1θ)2(1− i)i− bi− γi− φi+ φi2}+
+λ3{ρ− b+ d+ φi}+ µ1θ + µ2(1− θ) + µ3i,
where λ1 − λ3 are costate variables and µ1 − µ3 are Lagrange multipliers.
The necessary and sufficient first order conditions (see Section 6 the results on sufficiency)
are:
c : e−∆u′(c) = λ1 (7)
θ : −λ1f2(k, l)(1− δ2)(1− i)− λ22(1− δ1θ)δ1α(1− i)i+ µ1 − µ2 = 0 (8)
k : −λ̇1 = λ1[f1(k, l)− δ − b+ d+ φi] (9)
i : −λ̇2 = −λ1f2(k, l)(1− θ + δ2θ) + λ1φk + λ2α(1− δ1θ)2(1− 2i) +
+λ2[−b− γ − φ+ 2φi] + λ3φ+ µ3 (10)
∆ : λ̇3 = e
−∆u(c) (11)
µ1 ≥ 0, θ ≥ 0, µ1θ = 0 (12)
µ2 ≥ 0, 1− θ ≥ 0, µ2(1− θ) = 0 (13)
µ3 ≥ 0, i ≥ 0, µ3i = 0 (14)
Proposition 1. There always exists a unique disease free steady state with i∗ = 0, θ∗ = 0,
l∗ = 1 and k∗ and c∗ are determined by
f1(k, 1) = ρ+ δ
c = f(k, 1)− δk − (b− d)k.
Proof. From i̇ = 0, we have one disease free steady state i∗ = 0 and thus µ3 > 0. From
equation (8), we have
µ1 − µ2 = λ1f2(k, l)(1− δ2).
If δ2 < 1, µ1 > µ2 ≥ 0. Therefore, µ1 is strictly positive and implies θ∗ = 0. Then, from
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equation (5), l∗ = 1. From equation (9), we have
λ̇1
λ1
= −[f1(k, 1)− δ − b+ d].
Moreover, from equation (7), we have
λ̇1
λ1




Since the economy is bounded, all economic variables including k, c and l are constant in
the steady state. That is, ċ = 0 in the steady state. Thus, combing the above two equations,
we have
f1(k, l) = ρ+ δ,
from which we can solve for k∗. c∗ is derived from equation (2) with k̇ = 0 in the steady
state.
Proposition 2. Define the function:
G(θ) = −λ̃22(1− δ1θ)δ1α(1− i)i− λ̃1f2(k, l)(1− δ2)(1− i), (15)
where
i = 1− b+ γ
α(1− δ1θ)2 − φ
(16)
l = (1− θ + δ2θ)
b+ γ
α(1− δ1θ)2 − φ
(17)
f1(k, l) = ρ+ δ (18)
c = f(k, l)− δk − (b− d− φi)k (19)
λ̃1 = λ1/e
−∆ = u′(c) (20)
λ̃2 = λ2/e
−∆ =
u′(c)[−f2(k, l)(1− θ + δ2θ) + φk] + u(c)φ/g
−g + b+ γ + φ− 2φi− α(1− δ1θ)2(1− 2i)
(21)
g = −(ρ− b+ d+ φi). (22)
There are three scenarios:
• If G(θ)|θ=0 < 0, then θ∗ = 0;
• If G(θ)|θ=1 > 0, then θ∗ = 1;
• Otherwise, θ∗ is determined by G(θ∗) = 0.
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Given the optimal θ∗, an endemic steady state exists if 0 < b+γ
α(1−δ1θ∗)2−φ < 1.
Proof. From i̇ = 0, we have one endemic steady state with i∗ = 1 − b+γ
α(1−δ1θ)2−φ . The
steady state exists only if 0 < b+γ
α(1−δ1θ)2−φ < 1. Then, we have µ3 = 0. From equation (5),
l∗ = (1− θ + δ2θ) b+γα(1−δ1θ)2−φ . From equation (9), we have
λ̇1
λ1
= −[f1(k, l)− δ − b+ d+ φi].
Moreover, from equation (7), we have
λ̇1
λ1




Since the economy is bounded, all economic variables including k, c and l are constant in
the steady state. That is, ċ = 0 in the steady state. Thus, combing the above two equations,
we have
f1(k, l) = ρ+ δ,
from which we can solve for k∗. c∗ is derived from equation (2) with k̇ = 0 in the steady
state.






f2(k, l)(1− θ + δ2θ) +
λ1
λ2














= −(ρ− b+ d+ φi)










Substitute all these into equation (10), we can solve for λ2:
λ2 = e
−∆ u
′(c)[−f2(k, l)(1− θ + δ2θ) + φk] + u(c)φ/g
−g + b+ γ + φ− 2φi− α(1− δ1θ)2(1− 2i)
.
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From equation (8), we have
µ2 − µ1 = −λ22(1− δ1θ)δ1α(1− i)i− λ1f2(k, l)(1− δ2)(1− i)
= e−∆G(θ),
where
G(θ) = −λ̃22(1− δ1θ)δ1α(1− i)i− λ̃1f2(k, l)(1− δ2)(1− i)
= −u
′(c)[−f2(k, l)(1− θ + δ2θ) + φk] + u(c)φ/g
−g + b+ γ + φ− 2φi− α(1− δ1θ)2(1− 2i)
[2(1− δ1θ)δ1α(1− i)i]
−u′(c)f2(k, l)(1− δ2)(1− i)
Moreover, equations (12) and (13) imply:
1) If G(θ) < 0 when θ = 0, that is, marginal benefit of lockdown is smaller than marginal
cost, the endemic steady state is the one with no lockdown (θ∗ = 0).
2) If G(θ) > 0 when θ = 1, that is, marginal benefit of lockdown is larger than marginal
cost, the endemic steady state is the one with full lockdown (θ∗ = 1);
3) Otherwise, the endemic steady state is the one with partial lockdown (0 < θ∗ < 1),
where θ∗ is determined by solving G(θ∗) = 0.
Whether an endemic steady state exists on what the optimal choice of quarantines, θ∗,
is in equilibrium. The proposition gives a stronger sufficient condition that does not depend
on the choice of θ.
4 Calibration and Simulation
The marriage of the economic and epidemiological models provides us a framework in un-
derstanding the close link between the the economy and disease prevalence. As the model is
too complex for closed form solutions, in this section, we calibrate the model and examine
the impact of varying parameters, i.e. changing efficacy of lockdown measure (compliance),
productivity of working at home and disease related mortality. The analysis here focuses on
the steady states before and after the change as we want to capture the medium to longer
term effects when investment and returns to labor and capital have adjusted.
The model shows that the economy is closely related to the prevalence of infectious
diseases. This in turn depends on all the fundamental economic, demographic and epidemi-
ological parameters in the model. The following parameters are chosen in line with the
literature: discount rate ρ = 0.055, capital share β = 0.36, depreciation rate δ = 0.05, and
the scale parameter in the production function A is normalized to 1. The utility function is of
CES form U(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ and we choose σ = 1, that is, the utility function is log utility. Using
the statistics from the World Health Organization (See WHO (2013)), we set the birth rate
b = 1% and death rate d = 0.5%. For the baseline case we set φ = 0.05, α = 0.2, γ = 0.005.
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Figure 2. G function
Note: This figure plots G for 3 values of α and calculates the optimal amount of quarantine, θ∗.
There are two disease-related model parameters: the contact rate, α and the recovery rate,
γ. These parameters determines the severity of disease prevalence. The higher the contact
rate, the easier it is to transmit the disease and the higher the disease prevalence. The higher
the recovery rate, the less severe the disease and the lower the disease prevalence. We set γ =
0.005 and examine how the G function, which determines the lockdown indicator θ, change as
the contact rate α varies. Figure 2 displays G as a function of θ, when α = 0.05, 0.2 and 0.3.
That is, how the net marginal benefit of lockdown changes when the lockdown measure varies.
We can see when α is very low (α = 0.05), the G function is below the zero line throughout.
It implies the marginal cost of lockdown is significantly higher than the marginal benefit, and
the optimal choice is no lockdown. When the contact rate increases, the G function shifts
up gradually, suggesting the net marginal benefit increases. When α = 0.2, the optimal
choice is a partial lockdown. And when the contact rate is very high α = 0.3, the marginal
benefit outweighs the marginal cost and a full lockdown is the best response. In these case,
once we know θ∗ we can calculate the reproduction rate i∗ = 1− 1
R∗0
= 1− b+ γ
α(1− δ1θ)2 − φ
.
Thus, R∗0 =
α(1− δ1θ∗)2 − φ
b+ γ
. This is illustrated in the simulations below where as the
parameters change, so does θ∗ and the R∗0 illustrated is the equilibrium reproduction rate
with the optimal (partial) quarantine in place.
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Figure 3. Steady state varying δ1
Note: This figure equilibrium steady values of the endogenous variables as compliance or efficacy of
lockdown, δ1 is varied. The blue line plots the steady state values in the standard utilitarian welfare
function and the red line for the extended welfare function.
4.1 Impact of increasing efficacy of lockdown measure
We examine the impact of increasing effectiveness or compliance with quarantine – δ1 on
equilibrium steady state values of the endogenous variables in an endemic steady state. As
we would expect, with low compliance, the optimal policy is not to have any quarantines
and the disease circulates unchecked. However, as compliance increase, the optimal policy
is to increase the quarantine and then to decrease it. The fraction of the infectives in the
population depends of the product of compliance and the quarantine (θδ1) and when com-
pliance is very high, the quarantine can be eased. However, infections are always decreasing
in a convex way leading to better economic outcomes which increase concavily and to lower
mortality.
4.2 Impact of rising productivity of working at home
Now we examine the impact of increasing productivity with quarantine – δ2 on equilibrium
steady state values of the endogenous variables in an endemic steady state. When produc-
tivity from working from home is low, the optimal policy is not to have quarantines as the
loss in output from the quarantine decreases reducing the conflict with controlling inflation.
As productivity from working from home increases, the optimal policy is to have more strict
15
Figure 4. Steady state varying δ2
Note: This figure equilibrium steady values of the endogenous variables as productivity from working
from home, δ2 is varied. The blue line plots the steady state values in the standard utilitarian welfare
function and the red line for the extended welfare function.
quarantines. With stricter quarantines infections fall and the economic variables increases
and mortality decreases. While this paper has homogeneous households its implications are
consistent with the emerging literature on working from home for different segments of the
population (Brown and Ravallion (2020), Lekfuangfu, et al. (2020), Lewandowski, Lipowska
and Magda (2020), Mongey, Pilossoph and Weinberg (2020)). For households who have
higher productivity from working at home during a quarantine, the infection rates will be
lower and the economic outcomes will be better than those who cannot. This suggests that
differentials may emerge across different segments of the population in terms of economic
and health impact and they may also have different views on desirability of a quarantines.
Note that we are plotting the optimal quarantine and outcomes, so while for households with
low home productivity, while the utility rates are lower and infection rates are higher, the
optimal response is still to have lower (or no) quarantines.
4.3 Impact of infectivity of the disease
In figure 5 we examine the effect of varying the infectivity rate, α. The results are in
line with what we expect: as the infectivity of the disease increases, after a threshold the
quarantine also increases. While the severity of the quarantine increase, the level of infections
16
Figure 5. Steady state varying α
Note: This figure equilibrium steady values of the endogenous variables as infectivity from disease, α is
varied. The blue line plots the steady state values in the standard utilitarian welfare function and the
red line for the extended welfare function.
and mortality remains relatively constant as the infections are driven by the product αθ∗.
However, the effect of increasing quarantine drives down the economic variables.
4.4 Impact of varying disease related death rate
In Figure 6 we vary the disease related mortality φ. For the utilitarian model (blue line in
the figures). This gives the striking result that increasing disease related mortality decreases
the intensity of the quarantines and increases total welfare even when accounting for the
higher mortality and shrinking population size as there is an increase in discounting. This
is similar to the “gift of the dying” in Young (1994). That paper had a Solow model and
the primary effect was increase in the capital-labor ratio. While we also have increase in per
capita capital stock when savings rates are changing, in our model, one of the key effects is
that the increased disease related mortality leads to lower infections. Thus, conditional on
survival, welfare increases. It, however, leads to the disturbing conclusion that if disease is
more fatal, it is better to let it run its course even if there will be higher mortality - this is





Figure 6. Steady state varying φ
5 An extended model with the disutility from infec-
tions and mortality
As the standard economic model gives a counter-intuitive result that increasing mortality
increases social welfare, we extend the welfare function to include a welfare loss due to
infections. As in the epidemiology model, the disease related mortality is a fraction of










0 (ρ−b+d+φi(τ))dτ [u(c)− χν(i)]N0dt
where ν(i) is the disutility from infections, and χ ≥ 0 is the weight.
Assumption 4. ν(i) : R+ → R is a convex function with ν ′ > 0 and ν ′′ ≥ 0 and ν(0).
When there is no disease prevalence, the disutility from disease mortality is of course
zero. For the case of loss from mortality only, we can write it as ν(φi) which is equivalent
to the objective as φ is a constant in this paper.
There are several recent papers that also include such an extended welfare function and
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we discuss a few of them that received prominence in the emerging literature.19 Alvarez,










where κ is the probability of finding a vaccine in a unit of time, η is the monetary loss of a
mortality (see Alvarez, et al. (2020, p. 7)). They assume constant wages, w, and effectively
discounting is at the interest rate, r, so that r = ρ. In our model wages are endogenous
as w = fl and we keep track of the changing population size which makes the discounting
endogenous. If we were to write the total welfare when there is no infectious disease, this
is the total discounted welfare in the neo-classical steady state and the minimizing the
loss as in Alvarez, et al. (2020) is equivalent to maximizing welfare via a lock-down in
the scenario where diseases are prevalent. The timing of arrival of an effective vaccine is
complex, as for most of the diseases with significant mortality including malaria, dengue,
HIV/AIDS, diarrhoea, and all coronaviruses circulating including SARS and MERS there are
no effective vaccines.21 Even for diseases such as tuberculosis for which BCG vaccines exist
coverage is mixed and there are issues of disease externalities and compliance (see Geoffard
and Philipson (1996)). A recent survey also showed that only half of the UK population
would definitely have the ccaccination if one was to become available and one-sixth would
definitely not have one (Duffy, et al. (2020)). Thus, we do not model vaccinations in this
paper.
Acemoglu, et al. (2020, especially p. 13-14) look at the efficient frontier between lives
lost which in our model and economic loss. They also are concerned with the situation
where a vaccine is found at time T after which there is no loss due to infections. As they
are concerned with a short-run and the current scenario of low interest rates, there is no
discounting. The economic loss is also a weighted wage loss from those quarantined and
those isolated and the loss in expected wages of those who have premature disease mortality.
The loss due to mortality is the total number of mortalities.
Jones, Phillipon and Venkateswaran (2020) have a discrete time dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium model where the welfare function effectively use (see p. 4) is that of a
representative household:
u(ct, lt, it, Dt) = l log(ct) + i(log(ct)− uk)− uDDt,
where Dt is the disease related deaths in a time period. Thus, it is a weighted average of
utilities individuals who work, the disutility of those unable to work which is set equal to uk
and the welfare loss due to mortality, uD.
22 This is also an extended welfare function but it
19We recognize that this is a only a very selective survey of the emerging literature and that they have
different structures and modeling of epidemiology.
20We have changed notation in the cited equations to be close to that in our paper
21Smallpox is the only infectious disease to have been eradicated with a vaccination program. The vaccine
was developed in 1796 by Edward Jenner and the last case was observed in 1977.
22Their model as the Eichenbaum, et al. (2020) paper includes endogenous labor-leisure choice and only
a fraction of the infectives cannot work.
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does not explicitly keep track of the changing population size though discounting but only
through the loss in welfare from mortality.
Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt (2020) have a discrete-time dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium model without capital. The cost of infection is a consumption tax. Each
consumer is heterogenous and maximized discounted expected utility conditional of being in
a given health state. If an individual is to die, there is no continuation utility. While this
paper is a disaggregated model and does not model maximization total welfare, it is closer
to the pure utilitarian model.
Giannitsarou, Kissler and Toxvaerd (2020) have a model where there is disease related
mortality in an SEIRS model with disease related mortality where the objective is to maxi-
mize (constant) flow utility of the different classes where there is a cost to social distancing.
Their welfare function is closer to the spirit of a utilitarian welfare as there is no explicit cost
to infection and of mortality. These are implicit in the different flow utilities and changing
sizes of the groups.
In summary, the first three papers use an extended welfare function as we do and looking
at the welfare loss as in the first two papers23 is equivalent to maximizing welfare (as done
in the last two papers). How to weight the loss from mortality is an important one and
different papers have followed different routes. Eichenbaum, et al. (2020) have an estimate
close to EPA numbers while others have advocated using a value of statistical life measure
(see Hall, Jones and Klenow (2020) and Holden, et al. (2020)).
In the rest of the paper we will specialize the welfare function to make ν a function of
disease related mortality so as to be closer to the existing papers. Note, that the loss due
to economic loss due to the infection is already incorporated in the constraints and the loss
due to the change in population size is coming from the fact that we evaluated total rather










0 (ρ−b+d+φi(τ))dτ [u(c)− χν(φi)]N0dt
where ν(φi) is the loss in welfare from disease mortality, and χ is the weight. The constraints
are as before, i.e. (2-6). The F.O.Cs are the same as the baseline model, except the following
two equations:
i : −λ̇2 = −e−∆χφν ′(φi)− λ1f2(k, l)(1− θ + δ2θ) + λ1φk + λ2α(1− δ1θ)2(1− 2i) +
+λ2[−b− γ − φ+ 2φi] + λ3φ+ µ3 (24)
∆ : λ̇3 = e
−∆[u(c)− χν(φi)] (25)
The disease free steady state is the same as the baseline model. The model only differs
from the baseline model in incorporating the loss in welfare from disease mortality into the
23Acemoglu, et al. (2020) do not maximize welfare but only calculate the efficient frontier.
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objective function.
Proposition 3. Define the function:
GD(θ) = −λ̃D2 2(1− δ1θ)δ1α(1− i)i− λ̃1f2(k, l)(1− δ2)(1− i), (26)
where
i = 1− b+ γ
α(1− δ1θ)2 − φ
l = (1− θ + δ2θ)
b+ γ
α(1− δ1θ)2 − φ
f1(k, l) = ρ+ δ







u′(c)[−f2(k, l)(1− θ + δ2θ) + φk] + u(c)φ/g




−g + b+ γ + φ− 2φi− α(1− δ1θ)2(1− 2i)
g = −(ρ− b+ d+ φi).
There are three scenarios:
• If GD(θ)|θ=0 < 0, then θ∗ = 0;
• If GD(θ)|θ=1 > 0, then θ∗ = 1;
• Otherwise, θ∗ is determined by GD(θ∗) = 0.
Given the optimal θ∗, an endemic steady state exists if 0 < b+γ
α(1−δ1θ∗)2−φ < 1.
Proof. The proof mirrors the proof of Proposition 1 and is omitted for brevity.
The endemic steady state in the extended model differs from the baseline model in the
marginal utility of controlling disease, that is −λD2 . If we compare equation (28) and (21),
we have λD2 < λ2 when χ is positive. This is because when we take into account the disutility
from the disease death, there is additional loss from disease prevalence, which is captured
by the second term in equation (28). In other words, when we are able to control disease
prevalence and reduce the infection rate, there is additional marginal utility gain. Therefore,
the additional incentive from controlling the infection implies that the steady state level of
lockdown is higher in the extended model than the baseline one. Figure 7 depicts function
GD in the extended model and function G in the baseline model. We can see that with every
θ, the net marginal utility from additional lockdown is higher for the extended model. Thus,
the steady state level of lockdown (where the curve intersects with zero line) is higher for
the extended model.
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Figure 7. The determination of θ - G and GD function
Furthermore, we look at how the economy at the endemic steady state change when
we vary the weight given to loss in welfare due to mortality, χ, shown in Figure 8. When
the weight increases, the level of lockdown increases. As a result, the infection rate and
the disease related death drop. The labor force increases and so do capital, output and
consumption. However, the total utility decreases when the weight increases, as households
cares more about the disease mortality despite of the drop in death.
If we compare the results or varying the compliance to quarantine (3), varying produc-
tivity from working at home (5), and disease related mortality (6), the equilibrium steady
state values for the utilitarian model is in blue and for the extended welfare function is in
red. The equilibrium outcomes for the first two are similar with better disease and eco-
nomic outcomes for extended welfare function. However, for varying mortality, the results
are strikingly different: now under the extended welfare function, increasing mortality in-
creases severity of the quarantine leading to greater control of the disease, lower mortality
and better economic outcomes - labor force, capital, output and consumption. Thus, there
is no trade-off in equilibrium between economic outcomes and disease control. While total
utility initially decreases, it eventually increases as disease is controlled more aggressively.
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Figure 8. The effect of varying welfare weight χ
6 Sufficient conditions
In this section we study the sufficiency of the first order conditions with disease related
mortality. It is well known in the literature that with SIS or SIR dynamics the constraints
are not convex and it is unclear if either the Arrow or the Mangasarian sufficiency conditions
will be satisfied (Gersovitz and Hammer (2003))). Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014) provided
a sufficiency result in a neo-classical framework, such as in the current paper, with SIS
dynamics but no disease mortality.24 However, given the recent Covid-19 epidemic and
concern with mortality how incorporating mortality in the welfare function will affect the
sufficiency conditions has not been addressed in the literature to our knowledge. The problem
becomes non-trivial because including disease related mortality effectively makes the effective
discount rate, ∆, endogenous. The Hamiltonian is non-concave so in this situation the Arrow
and Mangasarian conditions do not apply (see below).
We directly show the inequality of local optimality of the Hamiltonian along any interior
path that satisfies the first order necessary and transversality conditions. This is done by
adapting the method of Leitman and Stalford (1971). As a corollary, the disease endemic
steady state will be locally optimal. Optimality of the disease free steady state is not in
question as it is the neoclassical steady state.



















t ) and co-state variables λt = (λ1,t, λ2,t, λ3,t).




H(xt, zt, λt) = e
−∆[u(c)− χν(φi)] + λ1{f(k, (1− θ + δ2θ)(1− i))− c− δk − (b− d− φi)k}+
+λ2{α(1− δ1θ)2(1− i)i− bi− γi− φi+ φi2}+ λ3{ρ− b+ d+ φi}
= e−∆[u(c)− χν(φi)]+ < λt, ẋt >
where < x,y >=
n∑
1
xjyj is the dot product of two vectors x = (x1, .., xn),y = (y1, ..., yn).
The first-order necessary conditions are satisfied at (x∗t , z
∗
t )
e−∆u′(c) = λ1 (28)
−λ1f2(k, (1− θ + δ2θ)(1− i))(1− δ2)(1− i)− λ22(1− δ1θ)δ1α(1− i)i = 0 (29)
−λ̇1 = λ1[f1(k, l)− δ − b+ d+ φi] (30)
−λ̇2 = −λ1f2(k, (1− θ + δ2θ)(1− i))(1− θ + δ2θ) + λ1φk + λ2α(1− δ1θ)2(1− 2i) +
+λ2[−b− γ − φ+ 2φi]− e−∆χφν ′(φi) (31)
λ̇3 = e
−∆[u(c)− χν(φi)] (32)
Remark 1. The Hamiltonian is not jointly concave in state and control variables if the
welfare function is positive, i.e. if u(c)−ν(i) > 0. In particular, the condition for the Hessian
matrix to be semi-negative definite which requires the principal minors Mj(j = 1, ..., 5) alter
in sign, starting with a negative determinant does not satisfied in our model.
Let us rewrite the Hamiltonian as H(k, i,∆, c, θ) then it is easy to check, the first minor
M1 = |Hkk| = λ1f11 < 0 and suppose that M2 =
∣∣∣∣ Hkk HkiHik Hii






∣∣∣∣∣∣ = H∆∆M2 + (−1)2+3H∆i
∣∣∣∣ Hkk 00 H∆∆
∣∣∣∣
= H∆∆(M2 −H∆iHkk).
Because H∆∆ = e
−∆[u(c)− χν(φi)] > 0, H∆i = e−∆χφν ′(φi)] > 0, Hkk < 0, we have
M3 = H∆∆(M2 −H∆iHkk) > 0 if M2 > 0.
So the condition for being semi-negative definite of Hessian fails. .
6.1 Transversality conditions





j,t = 0, j = 1, .., 3. (33)
24
Note that this condition holds only at the optimal solution x∗j,t , not for any admissible





Many studies in literature on endogenous discounting used a weaker transversality con-
dition where along the optimal paths
lim
t→∞
H = 0. (34)
The transversality condition (34) is taken from Michel (1982) for a constant discount
rate. Six and Wirl (2015) in a pollution model with endogenous discounting model25 using
the convergence of the state variable to a steady state show that if (33) holds then (34) also
holds. We will also show this but our model is non-convex and the state variables need not
converge to a steady state.
For the sufficiency, we assume only (33) holds. However, since our model is non-convex
with endogenous discounting, this condition is not enough for a sufficiency as the framework
of the earlier results do not hold. We provide a direct proof of sufficiency by proving the





j,t − xj,t) ≤ 0. (35)
These kind of tranversality conditions were assumed directly in Cartigny and Michel (2003),
Acemoglu (2009) (Theorem 7.11, page 246) for a sufficiency condition but for convex prob-
lems and standard discounting. This condition is difficult to check because the admissible
path xj,t does not necessarily satisfy the FOCs while the co-state λj,t is only determined at
the optimal path x∗j,t. We do not get any information for xj,t from two standard transversal-
ity conditions (33) and (34). However, if xj,t is bounded, then the condition limt→∞ λj,t = 0
implies (35). If λj,t ≥ 0 and xj,t ≥ 0 then (33) implies (35). Thus, Acemoglu (2009) (Theo-
rem 7.14) makes this assumption as limt→∞ λj,txj,t ≥ 0. In our model, the co-state variable
associated with the infective is negative so this inequality is only satisfied as a zero identity
which will be proven in our model.
In the following, based on the standard transversality conditions (33) and special struc-
ture of the model on the convexity in control variables (but not in state variables), and the
boundedness of state variables we are able to prove the transversality condition (35).
It is standard that 0 ≤ kt ≤ max{k0, k̂} where k̂ is the maximum sustainable capital
25The Six and Wirl (2015) model has one state and one control variable and is convex (see Appendix B
in that paper).
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stock26. Then is ct is bounded by a constant
27, ct ≤ A, and hence
u(c)− χν(φi) ≤ u(A) + χν(φ) < +∞ (36)
The proof proceeds via three Lemmas.
Lemma 1. We have
lim
t→∞
λ3,t(∆t −∆∗t ) = 0.
Proof. Consider any feasible path (xt, zt) with the same initial condition x
∗
0.
It follows from (32) that





τ [u(c∗τ )− χν(φi∗τ )]dτ.








τ [u(c∗τ )− χν(φi∗τ )]dτ ]∆∗t = 0.
Since limt→∞∆
∗






τ [u(c∗τ )− χν(φi∗τ )]dτ






τ [u(c∗τ )− χν(φi∗τ )]dτ +
∫ 0
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τ [u(c∗τ )− χν(φi∗τ )]dτ.






ρ− b+ d+ φiτ
.
26Definition of maximal capital stock is k̂ ∈ (0,∞) such that f(k, l) > k for all k ∈ (0, k̂) and f(k, l) < k
for all k > k̂. It implies k ≤ max{k0, k̂} := k̄.
27If investement is irreversible, then ct ≤ f(kt, lt) ≤ f(k̂, 1) := A. Otherwise, as in Goenka, Liu and Nguyen
(2014), we can assume that there exists κ ≥ 0, κ 6= ∞ such that −κ ≤ k̇/k. This reasonable assumption
implies that it is not possible that the growth rate of physical capital converges to −∞ rapidly and is
weaker than those used in the literature (see, e.g. Chichilnisky (1981)). Let us define the net investment
ι = k̇+(δ+b−d)k = f(k, l)−c−m, it then implies there exists κ ≥ 0, κ 6=∞ such that ι+[κ−(δ+b−d)]k ≥ 0.
If the standard assumption 2 (v) in Chichilnisky (1981) holds (non-negative investment, ι ≥ 0) then it holds
with κ = δ+ b−d. Therefore, assuming non-negative investment is stronger in the sense that κ can take any
value except for infinity. And we have ct ≤ f(k̄, 1) + κk̄ := A.
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Let denote qτ = ∆τ , if τ = t then qt = ∆t. If τ =∞ then q∞ = ∆∞ =∞.
Since 0 ≤ i ≤ 1 we get
1
































































ρ− b+ d+ φi








ρ− b+ d+ φ
≤ ρ− b+ d+ φi
ρ− b+ d+ φi∗




t →∞ as t→∞.
Therefore, for any feasible ∆t,
lim
t→∞





e−∆τ [u(cτ )− χν(φiτ )]dτ = 0. (38)
Together with (35) we have
lim
t→∞
λ3,t(∆t −∆∗t ) = 0.
Note that , since limt→∞∆t =∞ so from (38) we get limt→∞ λ3,t = 0.










t − it) = 0.
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t − kt) ≤ 0.




∗, (1− θ∗ + δ2θ∗)(1− i∗))(1− δ2)
2(1− δ1θ∗)δ1α
= −λ2i∗ → 0 (39)
by the transversality condition (33).
Because 0 < θ∗, l∗ = (1− θ∗ + δ2θ∗)(1− i∗) < 1, 2(1− δ1θ∗)δ1α < 2δ1α then
f2(k







When l = 1, then problem becomes a neoclassical model, our standard assumptions on
production f implies k∗ converges to a positive steady state thus f2(k
∗,1)(1−δ2)
2δ1α




λ1 = 0. (40)
On the other hand, as θ∗ ≤ 1 we have
f2(k






l∗ = (1− θ∗ + δ2θ∗)(1− i∗) ≥ δ2(1− i∗)





0 ≤ −λ2 = λ1
f2(k













2(1− δ1)δ1α(δ2 − l∗)
. (41)
We assume that there is no scenario of full lockdown where there is no disease at all.
Note that δ2 = l
∗ if and only if i∗ = 0 (no disease) and θ∗ = 1 (full lockdown). Therefore, it
is impossible that 2(1 − δ1)δ1α(δ2 − l∗) → 0 . Moreover, if l∗ = 0 then i∗ = 1 then steady
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state i∞ = 1, which is a contradiction with the result in Proposition 3, where an endemic
steady state exists if 0 < i∞ < 1.28 Therefore, f2(k
∗, l∗)(1− δ2)δ2 <∞ as t→∞.
Taking the limit of both side of (41), together with (40), we have
lim
t→∞
λ2,t = 0. (42)
Because i is bounded, we have limt→∞ λ2,ti
∗
t = limt→∞ λ2i = limt→∞ λ2,t(i
∗
t − it) = 0.
Michel’s theorem (Michel (1982)) assumes a constant discount rate for the condition (34).
We now show that it holds also for endogenous discounting based on the usual transversality
conditions,









[u(c∗)− χν(φi∗)] + lim
t→∞






λ3{ρ− b+ d+ φi∗}
where
B = [φ− α(1− δ1θ∗)2]i∗ − b− γ − φ.
It is easy to see that
0 ≤ |B| =











Moreover, using the results of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 (limt→∞ λ3,t = limt→∞ λ1,t =
limt→∞ e
−∆∗ = 0) with the fact that k∗, c∗, i∗, u(c∗), ν(φi∗) and f are bounded, it implies
that the transversality condition (34) is satisfied.
6.2 Sufficiency condition
We adapt the method developed by Leitmann and Stalford (1971) for a sufficiency condition
to our (non-convex) infinite-horizon optimal control problem for the endogenous discounting
28We denote the optimal steady state value of a variable x as x∞ to distinguish from the optimal path of
the variable which is denoted by x∗.
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problem. This condition is weaker than standard Arrow-Mangasarian sufficient conditions
(see Theorem V, Peterson and Zalkind (1978), page 595).
Define the augmented Hamiltonian H̄(xt, zt, λt) = H(xt, zt, λt)+〈λ̇t,xt〉 and M(xt, λt) =
maxzt H̄(xt, zt, λt) as the augmented maximized Hamiltonian.
We need the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. We have H̄(x∗t , z
∗
t , λt) ≥ H̄(x∗t , zt, λt) for all zt. In other word, given x∗t then
z∗t = arg max H̄(x
∗
t , zt, λt) and thus M(x
∗








t , λt)− H̄(x∗t , zt, λt)
= e−∆
∗
[u(c∗t )− u(ct)]− λ1(c∗t − ct)
+λ1[f(k
∗, l∗)− f(k∗, l̂)] + λ2[(1− δ1θ∗)2 − (1− δ1θ)2]α(1− i∗)i∗
= λ1[f(k
∗, l∗)− f(k∗, l̂)] + λ2[D(θ∗)−D(θ)]α(1− i∗)i∗
where l∗ = (1− θ∗ + δ2θ∗)(1− i∗), l̂ = (1− θ + δ2θ)(1− i∗) and D(θ) = (1− δ1θ)2 .
Since D(θ) is convex, we have
D(θ∗)−D(θ) ≤ D′(θ∗)(θ∗ − θ).
which implies
λ2[D(θ
∗)−D(θ)] ≥ λ2D′(θ∗)(θ∗ − θ) = −λ22(1− δ1θ∗)δ1(θ∗ − θ). (43)
because λ2 ≤ 0.
On the other hand, since f(k, l) is concave with respect to k and l,
f(k∗, l∗)− f(k∗, l̂) ≥ f2(k∗, l∗)(l∗ − l̂) = −f2(k∗, l∗)(1− δ2)(1− i∗)(θ∗ − θ).
Since λ1 ≥ 0,
λ1[f(k
∗, l∗)− f(k∗, l̂)] ≥ −λ1f2(k∗, l∗)(1− δ2)(1− i∗)(θ∗ − θ). (44)
As u(c) is concave we have
e−∆
∗




t − ct). (45)




t , λt)−H(x∗t , zt, λt)
≥ [e−∆∗u′(c∗t )− λ1,t](c∗t − ct)
−[λ1f2(k∗, l∗)(1− δ2)(1− i∗) + λ22(1− δ1θ∗)δ1α(1− i∗)i∗](θ∗ − θ)
= 0.
In line with Leitmann and Stalford(1971), we will use the following assumption.
Assumption 5. Assume that
H̄(x∗t , z
∗
t , λt) ≥ H̄(xt, zt, λt) (46)
Remark 2. Assumption A5 is weaker than assumption on the concavity of maximized
Hamiltonian M(xt, λt) in xt as in Arrow’s sufficiency condition. Indeed, assuming M(xt, λt)










t , λt) + λ̇j,t




t , λt)− H̄(xt, zt, λt) ≥ M(x∗t , λt)−M(xt, λt)







t − xt >
= 0
Also, if the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in state and control variables as in the Man-




t , λt)− H̄(xt, zt, λt) ≥< H̄x(x∗t , z∗t, λt),x
∗
t − xt > + < H̄z(x∗t , z∗t, λt), z
∗
t − zt >= 0.
However, in our model, the Hamiltonian is not jointly concave if the welfare function is
positive, i.e. if u(c)− ν(i) > 0. (see Remark 1 above).
Remark 3. In a model with exogenous discounting and the objective consist of only control
variables as in Goenka, Liu and Nguyen (2014), this assumption satisfies so the authors did
not need A5 for the proof of sufficiency.
We are now ready to prove the sufficient condition.
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Proposition 4. Consider the maximization problem (23) and suppose that an interior con-
tinuous (x∗t , z
∗
t ) and associated costate variables λt exist and satisfy (2)-(5) and (7)-(11).
Then under assumptions A2-A5, (x∗t , z
∗
t ) is a locally optimal solution of (P).

















t , λt)−H(xt, zt, λt)+ < λt,x∗t − z∗t >≥ 0. (48)
Taking integral over (48) we get
∫ ∞
0





















e−∆[u(c)− χν(φi)]dt ≥ − lim
t→∞
〈λt,x∗t−xt〉. (49)







e−∆[u(c)− χν(φi)]dt ≥ 0
and we get the sufficient condition.
Corollary 1. The disease endemic BGP with lockdown is locally optimal.
As the endemic steady state with positive lockdown satisfies the necessary conditions, we
have shown that it is indeed optimal.
Using the special structure of the autonomous problem we show that limt→∞ 〈λt,x∗t−xt〉 ≤
0. This condition is needed to check (local) optimality of a path that satisfies the necessary
conditions. This is crucial as when we check the maximality of the Hamiltonian we can
decompose it into two parts: the first just relies on the separability of control and state
variables and the concavity in control variables of the objective function, and thus, using
standard results the difference between the candidate solution and any other solution is non-
negative; and a term that depends on the co-state and the state variables as given above.
Recall, the non-concavity in the problem arises from the law of evolution of state variables
and the Hamiltonian is also non-concave. As indicated, we show this term converges to a
negative value, and we are able to obtain sufficiency of the first order conditions.
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7 Conclusion
This paper studied the effect of disease related mortality in an SIS model where the only
way to control the incidence of the disease is via a lockdown which can be interpreted either
as an optimally mandated quarantine or a self-imposed isolation chosen by the household.
The changing population size due to disease related mortality makes discounting endogenous
and raises two methodological issues. When we compare the equilibrium outcomes with a
utilitarian welfare function or with an extended welfare function that incorporates loss due
to disease related mortality, the former gives counter intuitive results. Thus, there is to be
a case to use the latter. While there is a trade-off in the welfare function, in equilibrium
there is no trade-off between health outcomes and economic outcomes. The second issue is
that with endogenous discounting in a model which is non-convex due to disease dynamics,
none of the existing sufficiency conditions apply. Using the special structure of the model we
directly demonstrate the sufficiency still holds. As epidemiology models generate non-convex
laws of motion for the state variables, care should be taken in the literature to show that
the results based on first order conditions are meaningful.
8 Appendix 1
Given θ∗, the disease dynamic is given by:
H = i̇ = α(1− δ1θ)2(1− i)i− bi− γi− φi+ φi2.
We know that there are two steady states when H = 0 given by:
i∗ = 0, and i∗ = 1− b+ γ





= −2[α(1− δ1θ)2 − φ]i+ α(1− δ1θ)2 − b− γ − φ.
In a disease free steady state:
∂H
∂i
|i∗=0 = α(1− δ1θ)2 − b− γ − φ.
Thus, if α(1− δ1θ)2− b−γ−φ < 0 the disease free steady state is stable and if α(1− δ1θ)2−
b− γ − φ > 0 it is unstable.
For the disease endemic steady state,
0 < i∗ < 1⇒ 0 < 1− b+ γ






|i∗>0 = −α(1− δ1θ)2 − b− γ − φ.
Thus, if α(1− δ1θ)2 − b− γ − φ > 0 then the disease endemic steady state is exists and
is stable while the disease free steady state is unstable. When α(1− δ1θ)2 − b− γ − φ < 0,
the disease endemic steady state does not exist and the disease free steady state is stable.
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andre rapport, Rapport fra ekspertgruppe pÃ oppdrag for Helsediroratet, 26 May 2020.
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